Minneapolis Police-Community
Conflict
Background
JPST 470: Conflict
Resolution
Dr. Cris Toffolo
April 2004
Elyse Rau
Liz Stone
Maggie Sweeney (Email:
socialists_us AT yahoo.com)
The history of the Minneapolis police-community conflict spans over 100 years, beginning back in 1902 when organized crime was invited into the city.[1] Corruption among both police and politicians was high during this era, from accepting bribes from criminals to the mayoral appointment of his own brother as police chief. In a 1934 Teamsters strike, Police Chief Michael Johannes sided with businesses and ordered officers to protect the interests of business, resulting in the injury of dozens of strikers and the death of two.[2] During the 1970s officers began to find a larger range of what was considered acceptable behavior, culminating with mayor Charles Stenvig's decision to exempt the police department from oversight by the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission. Since the officers were now less subject to investigation of citizen's complaints, they were found to act more physically.
By the time Tony Bouza took over as chief in 1980, the police culture embraced violence, evident when Bouza characterized the force as "damn brutal, a bunch of thumpers."[3] His effectiveness in reigning in police misconduct is questionable. Between 1985 and 1987, Bouza did not sustain any charges of excessive force against any officer.[4] Incidents continued throughout the 80s and 90s with little reprieve, although since 1995, both cases filed and allegations made against the police have dropped to less than half. However, these numbers only take into account the MPD Internal Affairs statistics and do not include numbers from the Civilian Review Authority, an external option to investigate complaints.[5]
The Minneapolis Police force and the community it is meant to “serve and protect” continue to struggle with allegations of misconduct, racism, and brutality, and in the past few years these issues have come to a head with the deaths of a number of individuals who suffered from either mental or physical illnesses as well as the accidental shooting of a 10 year old boy in the primarily minority Jordan neighborhood. Finally in 2003 action was taken - a federal mediator was brought in to help the community resolve the problem. Community-Police mediation ensued, and an agreement was made between the community and the MPD in December of that year. This discussion invariably excluded some community groups as time and space constraints dictated, and accusations of city influence in selecting community representatives detracted from the legitimacy of the agreement. Communities United Against Police Brutality, the main civilian working group, was excluded from the federal mediation and was unsatisfied with the result, criticizing it for failing to respond to community needs: “It is also clear from reviewing the agreement that people on the community team were either unaware of the extensive list of demands from the community or chose not to include those demands in the final agreement.”[6] As a consequence, CUAPB refused to endorse the agreement and is currently filing a class-action lawsuit on behalf of a man who claims to be a victim of police brutality in order to pursue resolution through the courts.[7]
The Minneapolis Police-Community conflict is an example of an asymmetrical conflict - the citizens have historically not been allowed recourse against police misconduct in a consistent manner. Citizens are also at a disadvantage because the police force is armed and often can be quite intimidating, even if unintentionally. In the past the city has seemingly done little to address police misconduct and continues to allow officers with multiple complaints to keep working with the force. Victims who attempted to pursue complaints against officers tend to face a long, drawn-out process with little hope of coming to an acceptable decision.[8] Both police and minority groups often feel disenfranchised from the criminal justice system, and clashes often result.[9]
The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) is one of the key actors at the root of this conflict. This organization can be split into two divisions. There is the administration: key leaders within the department such as the police chief and deputy chiefs, and the federation: a non-striking union of officers. The original Federation was founded in 1916 and incorporated in 1965 to represent the police officers of the Minneapolis Police Department and the Minneapolis Park Police. The first legal contracts between the federation and the city of Minneapolis were made in 1972. The Minneapolis Police Federation has been a non-affiliated union since 1972, and represents over 900 officers up to the rank of Captain.
“The purpose of the Federation is to foster and encourage a high degree of professionalism and to elevate and improve the working conditions of its members. The Federation also represents the police officers of the city in contract negotiations, matters related to working conditions, contractual disputes, grievance issues and arbitrations.”[10]
The MPD receives city funding and is held accountable to the city through contract negotiations, which must be approved by the city council. The MPD has an internal review board to investigate complaints against individual officers but is also subject to oversight from the human rights department and the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission as well as the Civilian Review Board.
The most prominent local civilian group working on the issue of police misconduct is Communities United Against Police Brutality (CUAPB). This organization was founded in 2001 and consists of "local activists, community leaders, concerned citizens, brutality survivors and family members of people killed by the police."[11] CUAPB has worked to increase accountability within the Police force by advocating for mediation, organizing public rallies to educate and organize the public, putting pressure on local officials through phone calls, press releases, and public meetings, and is currently pursuing a civil suit against the city of Minneapolis for failure to effectively discipline the police department. There are also other community groups involved in this issue - The Minneapolis Urban League, The City, Inc., and Anti Racist Action, to name a few prominent ones. These groups have continually lent their support and created awareness in favor of higher police accountability but police misconduct is not their central issue. There is also a national organization, Copwatch, whose sole line of work is to document police behavior and pursue charges when appropriate, but they have not played such a substantial role in the Minneapolis conflict as the local organizations.
The government within the city of Minneapolis is the third player in this conflict. Since the city government is directly accountable to their civilian constituents as well as being the economic force behind the MPD, they are ultimately responsible for police behavior as well as citizen safety and satisfaction. In addition to the financial aspect of departmental funding, the mayor and city council determine the federation contract and can pressure the federation to include certain clauses or consequences for misbehavior in their contract proposal; given this relationship, it is the city council and mayor who truly hold final disciplinary power over the department.
Communities United Against Police Brutality wrote a document aimed at influencing the federal mediation although ultimately they were excluded from that process. The “Community Federal Mediation Demands” outlines clear policy changes the community would like to see implemented and suggests sources for information for future trainings. Some of the key issues include matters of personnel, policy, supervision, discipline, investigation, record-keeping, and police-community relations. They concern themselves with minority representation on the force, specific trainings focusing on police behavior and responsibilities, especially when concerning constitutionality of police behavior.[12] CUAPB was not included in the official federal mediation, even though (or perhaps because) they had helped organize a coalition of community groups called Mediation Now and pressured Chief Olson to start mediation immediately.
The Minneapolis Police Department has long struggled with the community they are supposed to protect and serve. The force has been considered to be among the roughest in the country, to the point of receiving individual attention from Human Rights Watch in 1998.[13] Allegations and complaints of police misconduct have often been left without sufficient investigation or follow-up, and even when an officer is found to have committed misconduct, there is a distinct lack of discipline or consequences. More than once civil prosecution has been settled through payouts from the city and the officer is left in uniform. The force can often defend these allegations, however, because the law does allow for use of appropriate force when dealing with criminal suspects. Some complaints may be illegitimate simply because the plaintiff does not understand the legal allowances officers have. Despite some delinquent officers, the majority of the force does its job well yet still does not always receive the credit they deserve for maintaining a livable city. Even today, a small number of officers may have significant influence, according to former chief Bouza. "People like Mike Sauro represent 1 or 2 percent of the department, but he is a leader and leaders set the tone," Bouza said.[14] Currently the force is understaffed, leaving officers to ignore some of the smaller incidents in an attempt to crack down on more violent crime. This leaves the force in the precarious situation between criticism for being too rough and, on the other side, criticism for failing to effectively police the city. Former deputy Greg Hestness said "We can't say that we're going to prevent situations like the shootings from happening. But we're trying to reduce that possibility."[15] The MPD recognizes its influential role but also needs an understanding and cooperative community.
The Minneapolis communities define the conflict quite differently than the Minneapolis Police Department. Communities feel powerless because it appears the police are not reprimanded for inappropriate actions. Many citizens are scared to make complaints about police brutality in fear of further harassment by police.[16] Others feel there is no point to make complaints because police brutality cases are often judged by one person’s word against another’s. Many people have lost trust in the system because unnecessary force is used on a daily basis. The Minneapolis Urban League wrote in a 1994 study, "The black citizen is caught in an unenviable dilemma. They must depend on the police to provide basic services, yet do not trust the police to provide the service fairly and equitably. There is a basic mistrust for the police and the black African-American feels that at any time the police will turn on them and they will be the one incarcerated.”[17]
Minority communities view the conflict as an attack against them and often feel that they are being denied their civil liberties. The racial profiling numbers are astounding and the community hopes there will be something done to combat this blatant misuse of power. Communities United Against Police Brutality feel that “as police target particular communities, brutality becomes a weapon for the repression of people of color, immigrants, youth and others. The impact on our communities is to create a climate of fear and powerlessness while abusive police act with impunity.”[18] Citizens want police to be held accountable for their actions, and they want police to stop taking advantage of their authority. Their job is to ensure the safety of people in Minneapolis, not to create more violence and oppression. Minneapolis communities have been fighting police oppression for a very long time and its citizens see the problem as something that deeply affects their life.
The conflict in Minneapolis centers on the two main parties involved, namely the Police and the Community, and the polarized perspectives and expectations of each. However, both parties belong to and function as a part of a greater body, the City of Minneapolis. The City, run principally by the elected and representative Mayor and City Council, has its own stakes, concerns, and perspectives regarding police-community relations and conflict. Responsible to both the community and police department, the City also has unique obligations and responsibilities that shape the way in which it defines and addresses the conflict.
As both the mayor and city council are publicly elected, they are responsible to represent and address the needs and concerns of the community they serve. While the voting members of the entire city elect the Mayor, R.T. Rybak, the 13 council members in Minneapolis are elected by their respective wards and thus are responsible to “represent the interests of their constituents.”[19] However, the position of the City and elected officials is not simply guided and influenced by their responsibility to the community. The police department is an official function of the city and both the Mayor and City Council members have varying degrees of legislative, administrative and financial power over the department, as well as a responsibility to it.
The Mayor and City Council determine matters ranging from the budgets, to resolutions, to ordinances, to decisions regarding the appointment of positions in city leadership, such as the new chief of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD). In one Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) article regarding the recent search for a new Minneapolis police chief, Mayor Rybak is quoted saying, “I -- as the one elected official who has to represent all interests equally around the city -- and the police chief – the one person who’s in charge of having safety be consistent throughout the city – have to have a very tight bond.”[20] At the same time as the City makes decisions regarding the MPD, it must keep a focus on all of the other parts, with the overall city’s goals and concerns in mind. As Mayor Rybak stated well, they must represent all interest equally around the city, or within their ward. City Councilman Don Samuels describes his role and the “…weight of my responsibility as a council member to deliver safety and good quality of life to the community”[21] while holding a vigil and fast after repeated incidents of violence and homicides in his ward last summer.
While the conflict between police and the community is focused greatly on cases of brutality, “cultures of brutality and violence” and “institutional racism” as stated in the preamble of the Mediation Agreement reached in December, 2003, the focus of the actions and concerns of council members and the mayor seem to be focused on a different aspect. Rather, the city and its leaders have directed much of their attention and dollars to building better relationships and increasing understanding between the two parties, as well as to focus on the reduction of crime and revitalizing or redeveloping of the communities of Minneapolis. Finally, regardless of the passions, concerns, and perspectives of those running the city, the ideals and ways in which they see and define issues, conflicts, and problems is grounded in the reality of the limitation of funding and budgetary restrictions. It is arguable that one of the main factors framing the way in which the City sees the conflict between the Minneapolis community and police is the general concern for the livability and future well-being of the City. Necessary to achieving this is the improvement of the relationship between the conflicting parties, the police and the community.
On the official website for the City of Minneapolis there is a list of the City’s goals and expectations, approved by the City Council and Mayor in January 2003. The very first on this list states as a goal/expectation to, “Build communities where all people feel safe and trust the City’s public safety professionals and systems.”[22] Additionally, through the programs that the city has funded, supported, and initiated in recent years, there is a clear commitment and concern for the livability, community development and revitalization of the city. City programs such as Community Crime Prevention/Safety for Everyone (CCP/SAFE) focus on improving community and police cooperation and the quality of life in Minneapolis neighborhoods by reducing the opportunity for crime and fear of crime, as well as assisting in solving community problems, among other things.[23] Another central program to the City of Minneapolis is the Neighborhood Revitalization Project (NRP) that was launched by the Mayor and City Council in 1987. With annual city funding of $20 million, the NRP has tackled many of the problems facing Minneapolis from the community development perspective, as well as allocating a large portion of its money to community policing efforts.
Central to the livability and quality of a city or neighborhood is the degree and frequency of crime. In the Human Rights Watch report on Police Brutality in the United States, it is stated that, “As crime in Minneapolis is perceived as more serious and its police department has been confronted with more violent criminals, some observers claim it has overreacted to the crime threat by at times harassing members of minority groups and committing abuses.”[24] Working to reduce and fight crime in Minneapolis is not only a means to improving the livability of the neighborhoods; it is a way to address what may be one of the root sources or excuses for police behavior and brutality.
The reality of budget constraints, especially in the face of recent and large budget cuts, offers significant challenges to the goal of fighting crime, whether formally through the police force, or through other means such as community policing or neighborhood and community development. “Samuels and other city leaders are placing much of the blame on decisions made at the Capitol. ‘The naïve and stubborn pledge of no new taxes, which wreaked havoc on our LGA (local government aid), which funds our public safety, is now falling with a heavy hand on our community. Really, the poor and the vulnerable are suffering first’ Samuels says.”[25]
Arguing for the importance and need for redevelopment, such as that provided by the NRP, to reduce crime levels, Councilmember Gary Schiff states that, “The City of Minneapolis has tough budget times. We will face $55 million dollars in deficits in the next five years. One response could be to focus only on policing and infrastructure and to stop new investments in community development…but we can't turn our backs on the inner city. We need Redevelopment.”[26]
As with the individuals that make up the community and the police department, opinions and perspectives vary within those of city leadership. City Councilman Samuels of Ward 3 addressed and captured his understanding of the problem in his inaugural speech in February, 2003. “Our enemy is our own internal divisiveness. Our enemy is our loss of hope for the children of our community. Our enemy is the atrophy of surrender to decay. Our enemy is the misconception that all cops are abusive, or that all young black men are criminals. Our enemy is acceptance of mediocre results to our demands for livability.”[27] The lack of understanding between cops and members of the community, particularly members of minority communities, seems to be widely acknowledged and recognized as central to the problem. State lawmaker and police-community mediator Gregory Gray states, “I think the level of distrust between communities of color is so great, that [the police] think they are under siege, that they need to watch their back, that they can’t inform on what other officers are doing because they have to all stick together. On the other hand, I think the community feels that whenever anything happens it’s because the officer is racist.”[28]
Samuels, a member on the City Council’s Standing Committee for Public Safety and Regulatory Services, has been very active and vocal regarding the problems of violence and police-community relations and further discusses what he feels is an important part in improving the situation. Acknowledging the severity of the problem, he states that, “…we must diversify the police force to physically reflect the people it serves. White men tackling black and brown men to the ground, in grossly disproportionate numbers, 365 days of the year is a disheartening historical throwback to darker days. It has disastrous consequences…with open hearts we must enter into a new era of ethical transparency where this council’s integrity is above reproach and trust in government is restored to mint condition…Our overarching priority must be a restoration of public trust and we must be willing to relinquish prerogatives of convenience to achieve this essential goal.”[29]
Others among the 13 City Council members feel similarly about the importance of improving relations between the community and the police. Councilmember Gary Schiff, after announcing in his 2003 State of the Ward Address that his ward had seen the greatest drop in crime, comments that, “We have strong police-community connections among block clubs and Safe Teams, and Neighborhood Associations- and those relationships are paying off.”[30] However, regardless of desires and efforts to improve the relationships and the quality of life and safety in their wards, there is one hovering factor that limits even some of the greatest initiatives, finances and budget restrictions.
As in the case with most conflicts, in Minneapolis there are a variety of organizations and actors that play a role in the conflict centered on the police and community. The deeper into the conflict one goes, the more one is able to identify additional players and organizations involved. As mentioned earlier, the main players in this conflict include the police, the community, and the city. However, within each of these parties there are a variety of different functioning organizations. Furthermore, there are organizations that are involved in or representative two or three of the main parties, as well as organizations that fall outside of any of them.
The Police Federation, introduced at the beginning of this paper, functions as the main representative organization for the Minneapolis Police Department. Within the MPD there are the administrative bodies and various internal departments, including the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU). The IAU is responsible for investigating complaints of police misconduct that are filed or referred to the MPD, as well as complaints regarding violations of department rules and regulations.[31] While this is only one of the organizations through which citizens can report and file complaints, its direct association with the MPD creates a good degree of mistrust and fear from citizens. Furthermore, there is not much trust in actions of the IAU as, of the 148 complaints of excessive force that were filed between 1995 and 2001, only 6 were sustained. Cases that have resulted in the death of civilians are referred to The Sheriff’s Department for investigation with the intention of distancing the investigation’s direct connection to the MPD.[32]
The other main organization that was created as an alternative to receive complaints against police and improve their accountability is the Civilian Review Authority (CRA). Established in 1990 in response to citizens’ demands for an external body to handle police complaints, the CRA has been the subject of great scrutiny and the limitations that it is subject to greatly limit the effectiveness and use of the CRA. The CRA consists of a board of 7 members, with 4 appointed by the City Council and 3 by the Mayor, as well as an executive director, 3 investigators, and 3 administrative staff. Among the limitations that the CRA is criticized for is that it does not have subpoena power, a power that many believe is necessary to give any clout to the review process.[33] Additionally it is argued the CRA requires and unrealistically high standard of proof from the plaintiff, and that the process lacks the necessary transparency, as all meetings with accused officers occur behind closed doors.[34]
The record of the CRA is not much different than that of the IAU. According to the CRA’s 2000 Annual Report, of the 1373 complaints filed in approximately ten years, only 116 were found to have “probably cause for proceeding with an inquiry.” Of the 116, only 41 claims were sustained, though the discipline resulting was minimal. Even when the CRA sustains a claim, it does not have the power to take disciplinary action. The most it can do is to make recommendations and refer the case to the Chief of the MPD.[35] Due to budgetary cuts in 2002, the CRA has become more or less immobilized. The City’s Department of Civil Rights is an alternative option with whom citizens can file complaints against officers.
Representing the community in this conflict are dozens of organizations ranging from organizations created for and focused on the police-community conflict, such as Communities United Against Police Brutality (CUAPB), to each of the local neighborhood organizations that represent the 50+ neighborhoods of Minneapolis, such as the Hawthorne Huddle. Though the specific focus of these neighborhood organizations may not be police brutality or the relations with the MPD, it is something that they address and a place that empowers, organizes, and mobilizes members of the community towards issues that concern them, such as police brutality.
Other, non-geographically bound, organizations exist in great numbers as well throughout the community. Two of these that have played a significant role in the police-community conflict are the NAACP and the Minneapolis Urban League. Both of these organizations represent minority communities in Minneapolis, in large part the African American community. While initially not wanting to be directly involved in the conflict, they had a hard time remaining outside. As the mediation process was beginning, the mayor was demanding their representation at the negotiation table and since large numbers of their community were being affected by the conflict they were drawn further and further into the mediation.
Within the city, there are endless departments and commissions that are drawn into the conflict depending on the responsibilities and powers they hold regarding processes and individuals that are relevant to the conflict. The Department of Civil Rights plays a large role in the complaint process and accountability of officers. The Civil Service Commission holds and has used its position and power to reinstate offers after they were suspended or fired as a part of disciplinary action.[36] The City Council members and the Standing Committees within the council (such as the Public Safety and Regulatory Services Committee) have great decision making power and budgetary control, while subject to the greater decisions made by the state government.
Finally, there are numerous organizations that bridge the gaps or borders of the different parties involved. Organizations such as the Police Advisory Councils (PAC) in each ward attempt to offer increased communication and partnership between the police department and the community they serve. The City’s Community Crime Prevention/SAFE program has a mission to “reduce opportunity for crime, to deal effectively with the fear of crime, to increase neighborhood livability and to reduce unnecessary police calls for service, we serve neighborhoods and the business community by helping them to increase community cohesiveness and solve community problems.”[37] The Neighborhood Revitalization Project (NRP) is another joint organization among the parties. It is funded mainly by the City, while organized and led mostly by community members. Its concern for the revitalization of the community includes its relations with the MPD and neighborhoods’ safety and thus allocates a good portion of its fund to community policing efforts.
As a result of the Federal Mediation Process that ended in December of 2003, the Police Community Relations Council (PCRC) was created. This organization is intended to build relationships between the MPD and community leaders and organizations, as well as to oversee the compliance of the mediation agreement.[38] The process of the Federal Mediation also created a group representing the community, the Unity Community Mediation Team (UCMT), to speak for the concerns of the community. Though there was much internal division and conflict that came as a result of the process of determining who would be a part of the UCMT, it ultimately was the group that formally represented the community at the negotiation table.
The mediation process also brought into this local conflict parties from the larger, national level. The community group who was advocating for Federal Mediation contacted the US Department of Justice and the reputable Federal Mediator, Patricia Glenn. The Department of Justice’s Community Relation Service, which serves as the mediation branch, was soon involved and the mediation process began. [39]
The
extensive number and types of organizations involved in this conflict
emphasizes its dominance and significance to the parties and communities
involved. At the same time, they
represent the reality that there fails to exist an effective structural or
systematic way in which to tackle the conflict and attempt to move towards a
resolution. Though there is no shortage
of efforts and attempts to move forward in the conflict between the Minneapolis
Police and Community, there are numerous obstacles yet to overcome.
Power structures and imbalances are central to the Minneapolis Police-Community conflict. Because the conflict centers on two groups with very different degrees and types of power, it is difficult to bring them onto a level playing ground. In fact, much of the struggle thus far in the conflict has been directed toward leveling this power imbalance.
The MPD not only has the power of being an organized an official city department, but it also has the power of intimidation, force, and political clout. The conflict on the part of the community, however, began with individual victims and cases of police brutality. As these cases grew in number they gained energy and force, and the community developed organizations specific to the conflict as well as refocused the energy of already existing organizations to address the conflict. However, they still lack the formal organization and recognition that the MPD holds. The community is working against established regulations and processes that they find unjust or unfit without widespread or extensive understanding of all of the details and systems that establish and uphold these regulations or processes.
For example, there is the complaint, review, investigation, and disciplinary process for officers. The accountability of officers for their actions is one of the central demands of the community, as community members argue the current system is insufficient and unjust. However, there are extensive power structures to understand and overcome in order to make the changes they want to see happen. In order for the CRA to gain subpoena power, for example, there would need to be changed made to Minnesota’s Data Practices Act or an alteration made in the City’s charter by a unanimous City Council vote.[40]
A second major complaint of the community is in regard to the accountability of officers - few complaints are sustained, and of those sustained cases there is little disciplinary action taken. If and when officers are disciplined, the decisions are often reversed in and appeal and arbitration process. In a 1998 Human Rights Watch Interview with then Chief Olson, he stated that the arbitration process was perhaps the greatest barrier he faces in his efforts to hold police officers accountable for misconduct.[41]
As this illustrates, the state and city governance system is also another source of a power structure that can often work against the community in this conflict, as well as the MPD. Beyond the technicalities of legislation and acts that are passes and systems of arbitration, there is the fundamental power of the budget and finances. The budget cuts made by the state government in recent years have greatly impacted the Local Government Aid (LGA) that the city receives and that greatly funds the MPD. Nearly 40% of the MPD funding comes from LGA, and with Governor Pawlenty’s budget cuts, Minneapolis is losing 20% of its LGA.[42] Budget cuts also have resulted in the near complete cut of the funding to the CRA. According to Lydia Howell in the Southside Pride, “The CRA’s ineffectiveness made it an easy target for budget cuts”. As a result, rather than investing in improving or reestablishing a better CRA or other institution of police accountability, it was nearly completely eliminated. Budgets and the reality of funding costs was also a large concern during the mediation process and the lack of funds continues to be a significant obstacle in the ability to achieve the goals set out by the mediation agreement.
Legal power structures are also a significant factor in this conflict. The power of one individual case is limited in its influence, assuming that the litigation is even successful. When it is an officer’s word against a citizen’s, without substantial evidence the citizen’s word alone is typically not enough to justify action, conviction, or discipline. Furthermore, the reputation of a Police officer as posed beside the status of member of a minority community create an additional power structure - one based largely on race - that must be overcome. Complicating the process and adding to the imbalance of power are rulings such as the US Supreme Court’s 1994 ruling of Heck v. Humphrey that states that if you are convicted of a crime in a state court, you cannot bring a civil rights action to the federal courts.[43]
The
development of the Class Action Lawsuit is an example of a way in which to
attempt to overcome these power structures.
Groups and alliances between community members and other parties or
individuals are also a means to overcoming the power imbalances.
Since the definition or determination of who is included in the “main parties” to this conflict is rather vague and flexible, it also leaves indeterminate and fluid those who are considered “outside parties” and who are considered “organizations involved in the conflict”. However, there are a few notable and significant groups that have influenced the Minneapolis Conflict particularly because of their place outside the conflict.
Two of the more significant of these outside parties are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Both international human rights organizations that observe and report human rights abuses, HRW and AI have taken note and written reports on police brutality in the Minneapolis, and the United States as a whole. These reports have extensive and well-compiled information regarding the situations and conflict around police brutality and serve to bring attention to the problem from both parties involved in the conflict as well as outside observers.
This role of bringing attention to the conflict is true of a number of other parties that have become involved. On the Federal level, in 1999 the Attorney General Janet Reno acknowledged “there is a problem,” stated that “effective policing does not mean abusive policing” and presented a five-point program to improve accountability and repair police-community relations.[44] Additionally, as has been discussed, the US Department of Justice was called upon to help in instigating a mediation process in Minneapolis. Although originally this mediation was a source of great dispute among city leaders, giving rise to concern, fear and paranoia of having any federal intervention or presence in the city, it eventually resulted in the Mediation Agreement of Dec. 2003. [45] The FBI has also been called upon at times to investigate incidents of brutality.[46]
Finally,
there is the undeniable influence and presence of the media in the
conflict. Bringing attention to the
conflict, the media has the ability to highlight particular occurrences while
leaving others in the shadows. Archived
media is also currently the main source of information on this conflict,
outside of primary sources and interviews of individuals involved.
Ideologies play a large role
in the conflict between the Minneapolis Police Department and Minneapolis
communities. The American Heritage
Dictionary defines an ideology as "the body of ideas reflecting the social
needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or culture." Naturally the ideologies differ greatly
between average citizens and police officers because their needs and
aspirations are different. Components
that play a large role in the formation of ideologies, such as power
distribution, race, ethnicity, origin, and language, have an immense effect on
the conflict between the Minneapolis Police Department and Minneapolis
communities.
One major issue at hand is
the unequal distribution of power.
Among other aspects of life, a person's ideology is formed by their
position in society, and in the case with the police department, citizens are
immediately at a disadvantage in regards to their personal power. The police department is a large portion of
a powerful governing body while the communities, though strong in number, are
subject to the decisions and actions of the governing body. Police brutality takes this further by
exploiting the unequal distribution of power, and in return affecting people's
attitudes towards police officers.
Another important aspect in
the conflict between the Minneapolis Police Department and Minneapolis
communities is race. Eighty-four
percent of the Minneapolis Police Department is Caucasian, while many of the
people they deal with are racial minorities. When questioned about the diversity
of the Minneapolis Police Department Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski felt that the
effectiveness of the police force would be increased if it were more racially
diverse. Minnesota is one of the few
states in the country that requires a candidate applying for police employment
to hold a degree. This makes it much
more difficult for police forces in Minnesota to be diverse because it adds an
economical standard in order to become a police officer.[47]
The impact of race on the conflict
goes beyond the blatant racial disparity in the police force. Sixty-one percent of police brutality
complaints turned into the Civilian Police Review Authority in 1996 were made
by racial minorities.[48] A
racial profiling study in 2002 found that Latinos and African Americans are
twice, sometimes three times, as likely to be stopped in their automobiles by
police and are much more likely to be searched.[49] A study examining racial profiling between
1994 and 1999 found that African Americans were eleven times more likely to be
arrested for drinking alcohol in public, nineteen times more likely to be
arrested for trespassing, twenty-seven times more likely to be arrested for
lurking, and forty-two times more likely to be arrested for not having a valid
drivers license. The study concluded
that African Americans are being arrested for crimes that many officers ignore
in other circumstances. Many of these
African Americans are arrested and jailed, but not convicted of committing any
crime.[50] The imprisonment ratio between blacks and
whites is twenty-five to one, which was the highest in the country in
2000. Throughout the United States,
African-Americans make up six percent of the population but are fifty percent
of the prison population.[51]
Racial profiling can
possibly be attributed to the implementation of Minneapolis Police Department’s
CODEFOR strategy. CODEFOR, which stands
for Computer Optimized Deployment Focus On Results, was introduced to
Minneapolis police by the New York City Police Department and first implemented
in Minneapolis in 1998. It is an
aggressive police strategy based on four principles: accurate and timely
intelligence, rapid deployment of personnel and resources, effective tactics,
and relentless follow-up and assessment.
Intelligence and police reports are used to create a map of the city
highlighting specific areas in which there is a high rate of certain
crimes. Officers are then positioned in
these areas, focusing on patterns of the time and place of where crime is
occurring. The effective tactics in
this strategy revolve around the reduction of misdemeanor (quality of life)
crimes. By strictly enforcing these
crimes, police feel they are eliminating the environment that feels comfortable
to criminals as well as making it easier to discover fugitives and confiscate
weapons. Every week, officers meet to
discuss new patterns and update previous maps.
After two years of this program, serious crime was reduced by
twenty-seven percent, resulting in the lowest level of reported crime since
1966.[52]
Although former Minneapolis
Police Chief Olson claims CODEFOR does not encourage racial profiling, other
people disagree. Critics of CODEFOR
argue that the strategy singles out low-income minority communities and encourages
officers to deny people of their civil liberties. Police are stopping people for playing loud music and spitting on
the sidewalk, something they probably would not prosecute in other
neighborhoods. Community members also
feel that the strategy hurts the relationship between police and the
community. A 2001 poll showed that
fifty-five percent of African Americans, in comparison to fourteen percent of
Caucasians, feel their relationship with Minneapolis police is poor.[53] A similar poll conducted in ninety-nine
found that seventy-seven percent of African Americans feel that racial
profiling is widespread, while only fifty-six percent of whites do. Chuck
Samuelson, executive director of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, adamantly
disapproves of the CODEFOR system. He
feels that “CODEFOR calls for the kind of aggressive enforcement that would get
the police chief in Edina thrown out.
Minneapolis police are making certain types of stops in parts of the
city that they wouldn't make in another part”.[54] A Hennepin County Public Defender went so
far as to rename CODEFOR as “Computer Optimized Deployment Focused On Race”.[55] In response to criticisms, former Police
Chief denied any allegations of racial profiling.[56] These racial problems with the police force
and Minneapolis communities intensify the conflict and prohibit understanding
between the two groups.
In addition to the
importance of race, immigrants and refugees also have an effect on the
conflict. Many new immigrants in the
United States have fled their homelands due to political, religious, or ethnic
persecution. Minnesota is a hot
destination for refugees. Statistics
show that in the U.S. as a whole, about ten percent of new arrivals are
refugees, while in Minnesota that number is fifty percent.[57] The
ideologies of immigrants and refugees are entirely different from those who
have grown up in the United States.
Many immigrants have negative preconceived notions about police due to
their past experiences. It is also very
difficult to reach a level of understanding among immigrants and police because
of strong language barriers. Although
the Minneapolis Police Department has translators, the dependability of this
service on the spot is tough.
Power distribution, race,
ethnicity, origin, and language all play a large role in shaping the conflict
between the Minneapolis Police Department and Minneapolis communities. They define the different ideologies
people have and how they view the world.
They also pose as definite problems that must be addressed in order for
the conflict to be resolved.
The United States is a
capitalist society in which profit is both desired and strived for, many times
without regard to other aspects of life.
Military power and economic leverage are utilized by the United States
in their globalization efforts to obtain their interests worldwide. This has an impact on the conflict between
the Minneapolis Police
Department
and Minneapolis communities because it involves physical force and people
who
have powerlessly been subject to an authoritative giant. The United States is the most militarized
country in the world and the violence it creates has an effect on society as a
whole. It desensitizes violence and
allows police officers to rationalize the use of brutal force towards
civilians.
Presented here is a partial history of police-community conflict. Included are some key incidents that have set precedents regarding settlement of suits, discipline for offending officers, and work between all sides in an attempt to improve Police-Community relations as well as diminish Police misconduct. These incidents by no means encompass the scope of alleged police misconduct nor do they constitute the final manner of settlement, but they do allow for an analysis of the problem and point to possible solutions.
1975
Mayor Charles Stenvig, former police sergeant and head of the officers’ union, exempted the police department from oversight by the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, charged with upholding local civil rights law. The exemption required that anyone with a discrimination complaint against a police officer or the department had to instead file a complaint with the state Human Rights Department.
Critics argue this change “is aimed at people with discrimination complaints against the police. [It] denies citizens the use of the Minneapolis Civil Rights process, requiring them to file with the state Human Rights Department instead. There, they must line up with people from all 87 counties in Minnesota. This creates a logistical obstacle for complainants, especially low-income people who may lack the transportation, telephone or stable mailing address necessary to work effectively with an agency located in St. Paul.” Supporters were concerned “the Civil Rights Commission would be biased against the police.” The procedure has been criticized in the past as being inconvenient for city residents. It also was pointed out that few, if any, other cities in the country prevented their civil rights agencies from dealing with discrimination cases involving police.
1980
February Tony Bouza is appointed as Police Chief, following a particularly brutal police record under the previous chief. Bouza admitted “police will abuse their power” attempted to change the culture, unsuccessfully: “I changed behaviors, but not attitudes.”
1981
Hobart Mitchell Jr., as president of the Minneapolis chapter of the NAACP in the early 1980s, was among black community leaders in 1981 urging a boycott of the Minneapolis Police Department's Internal Affairs Unit. The unit had "an extremely, extremely low track record" in responding to complaints by blacks about police brutality, harassment and intimidation, he said.
1983
Two Indian men (Charles Lone Eagle and John Boney) were stuffed into the trunk of a Minneapolis squad car to be taken to a detoxification center. 12 years later, the two men win a $100,000 settlement when jurors decided that officers Marvin Schumer and Michael Lardy had violated their civil and human rights.
1985
September 1 The city Commission on Civil Rights calls for a criminal investigation into allegations that police fired tear gas at a wedding reception, as well as for a congressional inquiry of other alleged police brutality, particularly against minorities.
The Civil Rights Commission task force also suggested the forming of a Civilian Review Board, which is eventually formed. The results, however, are questionable: Herman Milligan Jr., a member of the commission, said he studied complaints of excessive force that were filed from July 1, 1983, through April 5, 1985. "During that time," he said, "118 complaints of excessive force were filed, and not one officer was found guilty. That defies all laws of mathematical probability. "If the citizen really feels there is no justice within the (police) internal affairs unit, then the question is, where can they go for justice?"
1988
The Internal Affairs Division logged 187 complaints this year, compared with 182 for all of 1987. More than 150 of those complaints were made by civilians, said Sgt. Dave Niebur, newly appointed head of the unit. They include allegations of excessive force, verbal abuse, use of profanity and departmental infractions.
The rise in complaints of alleged police misconduct has prompted cries for reform, including an independent panel to investigate allegations. In addition, several agencies are calling for increased monitoring of police conduct.
A newly formed Minneapolis Coalition for Police Accountability holds community meetings to discuss ways to deal with police misconduct. (The Coalition won an award in 1992 from MN council of nonprofits for their work with Police-Community communication and cooperation)
September the Minneapolis Urban League (MUL) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) launch a hot line to take calls on alleged misconduct and have forwarded 55 cases to various agencies for investigation. The 24-hour hot line documents and screens incidents, after which legal action could be considered, Matt Little, of the NAACP said, "we don't feel the Internal Affairs is handling them properly.” In the past six months, the Urban League logged 78 complaints, and the NAACP has been averaging about two calls a week, they said.
December 23 Tony Bouza steps down as Minneapolis Police Chief. During his term the number of women and minority officers increased, as did the number of officers on the streets, although the size of the force has stayed the same.
1989
January 3 John Laux is sworn in as Minneapolis Police Chief.
January 25 In a mistaken raid a stun grenade - designed for use in hostage situations - cause a fire at an elderly African-American couple's home, killing them.
February 6 Police raid a hotel room where black college students were having a party and party-goers were reportedly roughed up by officers. The media coverage surrounding both incidents brings Minneapolis Police conduct to the forefront.
February 8 The Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission urges the City Council to reinstate the commission's authority to investigate allegations of police brutality and misconduct, but police chief John Laux rejects the proposal, saying it would weaken his control of the department. Commissioners make the recommendation in the wake of recent charges by blacks of police brutality and racism and also agree to seek a congressional investigation into alleged police brutality.
July 21 An advisory panel forms to make a recommendation to the Minneapolis City Council on how to create a citizen board to review claims of police misconduct. Two key issues are debated: how board members are selected and the scope of the review board's disciplinary powers.
Police conduct, particularly in incidents involving minorities, has become a major issue this year for city officials, who have fielded complaints of police brutality and the department's failure to effectively investigate citizens' claims.
The minority community (African-Americans, Native Americans, Latinos and Asians made up about 14 percent of the city's population in the early 1990s) demand improved accountability for the police, leading to the creation of the Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) in 1990, as described below.
1990
January 26 The Civilian Review Authority is created by city ordinance for the purpose of “investigating allegations of misconduct on the part of officers of the Minneapolis Police Department and making findings of fact and conclusion based upon those findings of fact.” Examples of misconduct include excessive force, inappropriate language, failing to provide adequate or timely police service or discrimination on the basis of protected class stats (race, gender, age, etc.) An independent board of directors was appointed by the Mayor (3 appointments) and by the City Council (4 appointments). The board was independent in that it was not directly governed by the City of Minneapolis or the MPD. The board is comprised of community representatives.
December 1 White officer Dan May shoots Tycel Nelson, a 17-year-old African American. A woman who was pregnant with Tycel Nelson’s child at the time of the shooting files a wrongful-death claim. The suit also was filed on behalf of Nelson's son, who was born six months after his death, and Nelson's mother, Earline Skinner. In October 1993, the city of Minneapolis settled the suit for $250,000.
1992
September 25 Minneapolis Police Officer Jerry Haaf was shot and killed, and the suspects were African-American. One of the suspects in the shooting alleged brutality by the Hennepin County sheriff's deputies detaining him.
1994
July 28 Police Lieutenant Mike Sauro receives a $700,000 verdict a federal jury handed down against him and the city of Minneapolis. The jury found the city liable for showing "deliberate indifference" toward brutality complaints.
1995
March 23 Robert Olson is sworn in as Minneapolis Police Chief
The police brutality/crime hot line set up in 1988 by the Urban League receives 30 to 40 calls per month, most complaining about police brutality or discrimination.
1996
Olson's main efforts for departmental reform are on three fronts:
- Hiring: "You need to take a look at who you're hiring. There are screening devices you can change."
- Training: "A lot of people come from places where they might not have had much interaction with people of color...A program run by the Urban League and the Police Department that allows officers-in-training to work in minority community organizations is a good start."
- Investigating complaints: Olson said he has changed the internal affairs process, allowing investigations to start sooner even if it might mean turning up damaging evidence against the officer while the city is being sued.
- The department will also pay closer attention to residents' complaints against officers, he said. "We're going to start monitoring the number of complaints that come up whether they're sustained or not. That way, you might be able to do some retraining or take some steps after five complaints instead of waiting until someone has 20."
1997
October 31 Progressive Minnesota brings supporters to a news conference outside City Hall Thursday to urge a yes vote on Minneapolis Charter Amendment 146, which would bring city police officers under jurisdiction of the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission, overturning the 1975 decision by Mayor Stenvig to protect the police department from oversight and prosecution from the MCRC. If approved, Amendment 146 will apply Minneapolis Civil Rights law equally to the actions of all Minneapolis city government employees, including police officers.
November 4 Voters on Tuesday overwhelmingly gives the Minneapolis Civil Rights Commission the authority to review the actions of the city's Police Department and its officers in cases that involve possible discrimination. The change means citizens no longer have file complaints with the state Human Rights Department in St. Paul but can go to the Civil Rights Department for an investigation instead.
2001
August Communities United Against Police Brutality is founded - made up of local activists, community leaders, concerned citizens, brutality survivors and family members of people killed by the police, they work to better the system of accountability and oversight of the department.
2002
March 10 Police shoot and kill Abu Kassim Jeilani, a Somali man suspected to be suffering from mental illness and wielding a machete and crowbar. Rallies follow, drawing hundreds of citizens concerned about police brutality and prejudice against immigrants. The MPD responds with an option that would allow more Minneapolis police officers to use a beanbag shotgun designed to deal with people in crisis situations without killing them.
August 1 A shootout in a south Minneapolis high-rise results in the deaths of a white police officer, Melissa Schmidt, and an elderly black woman, Martha Donald.
August 22 A riot starts in north Minneapolis's Jordan neighborhood when an officer's stray bullet hits an 11-year-old black child in the arm.
September 13 The Minneapolis City Council gives the civil rights department 60 days to integrate the Civilian Review Authority into its fold permanently. While some argue that the move saves the CRA (and grants it a bigger budget), critics say it further cloisters the board and scuttles any autonomy the CRA may have had.
November The City Council approves a plan for talks to begin in December under the direction of a U.S. Justice Department mediator. Community groups chose a team of representatives.
November 13 the city council approves Olson's outline for mediation and schedules a final council vote on the entire process for November 22.
November 16 Community representatives for the Federal Mediation were democratically elected at an open community meeting which had been widely advertised and held by a coalition of neighborhood organizations, including CUAPB, called Federal Mediation Now.
December Police Chief Robert Olson delays the start of talks because the community panel didn't include established civil- rights organizations such as the NAACP and the Urban League.
2003
January Communities United Against Police Brutality files a petition in Hennepin County District Court seeking to compel Olson to start mediation.
March The City Council sets a deadline of Friday for the CUAPB to drop the petition. They do so but filed a federal class-action lawsuit on behalf of a man who claims to be a victim of police brutality.
April 19 In a news conference at City Hall, lawyer Jill Clark publicly announces that Communities United Against Police Brutality has withdrawn a lawsuit in Hennepin County District Court that demanded a start to federal mediation on the issue, but she reveals the new federal class-action suit on behalf of a man who says he was beaten by Minneapolis police.
October 23 Rallies in about 50 cities nationwide participating in the 8th annual National Day of Protest Against Police Brutality
Ron Edwards, longtime activist in the NAACP, contacts federal mediator Patricia Glenn, a mediator from the U. S. Department of Justice, and asks her to come assist the community in setting up mediation.
December 4 After a months-long mediation process between a diverse coalition of community groups and representatives of the Minneapolis Police Department, an agreement is been reached.
December 5 All parties involved sign The Federal Mediation Agreement.
2004
February 17 - William McManus is sworn as the new Minneapolis Chief of Police in the City Hall Rotunda. He purports to uphold and enforce the federal mediation agreement and immediately begin investigation of three officers who were involved in a friendly-fire shooting, placing them on paid leave but ultimately decided not to file charges against the officers.
American Civil Liberties Union. (ACLU). “Compelling Evidence of Racial Profiling and Double Standards of Enforcement in Minneapolis,” <http://archive.aclu.org/news/2000/w072300b.html> 3/18/2004.
Amnesty International: “United States of America, Race, Rights, and Police Brutality.”
1 September 1999.
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/EngamR511471999>
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement: <www.aele.org>
City of Minneapolis Official Website. 1997-2004.
<http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us>
City Pages. 2004
<http://www.citypages.com>
Communities United Against Police Brutality.
<http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/HomePage.asp>
Human Rights Watch: “Shielded from Justice, Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States.” June, 1998.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm>
Minneapolis Police Federation. 2002.
<http://www.mpdfederation.com>
Minneapolis Public Library: A History of Minneapolis. “Residents of the City: 20th Century Growth and Diversity.”
< http://www.mplib.org/history/re2.asp>
National Lawyers Guild – Minnesota Chapter, “Driving While Black in Spotlight,” <http://www.nlgminnesota.org/newsletter/NLGNews_05_01.pdf> 3/18/2004.
Neighborhood Revitalization Project.
<www.nrp.org>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “The Jordan Shuffle”. City Pages. 23.1138 (9-25-02).
<http://www.citypages.com/databank/23/1138/article10727.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”. City Pages. 23.1139 (12-02-02).
<http://www.citypages.com/databank/23/1139/article10758.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “Off Beat”. City Pages. 24.1154 (1-15-03).
<http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1154/article10997.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “Waiting for Chief Olson”. City Pages. 24.1157 (2-05-03).
<http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1157/article11037.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “The Two Jills”. City Pages. 24.1163 (3-19-03).
<http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1163/article11127.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G. R. “The Usual Suspects”. City Pages. 24.1174 (06-04-03).
< http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1174/article11301.asp>
Anderson, Jr., G.R.“Federal Mediation: A Cheat Sheet of Sorts” The City Haul. (6-04-03)
<http://babelogue.citypages.com:8080/granderson/2003/06/04>
Anderson, Jr., G.R. “Living in America,” City Pages. (10-01-03). <http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1191/article11535.asp > 3/22/2004.
Brunswick, Mark, Chris Graves, and Staff Writers. “Police departments' styles have roots in cities' past” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Jul 28, 1994. pg. 01.A
Chanen,
David. “Data
Deepens Racial Profiling Divide.” Minneapolis Star Tribune.
(1-21-01). <http://www.legis.state.wi.us /senate/sen04/news/articles/art2001-8.htm> 3/21/2004.
"Drug Enforcement in Minority Communities: The Minneapolis Police Department," Police Executive Research Forum/National Institute of Justice, 1994, p. 7. (PERF study).
Hodges, Booker T. “What Happened During Federal Mediation.” Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder. (12-17-03).
<www.spokesman-recorder.com/News/Article/Article.asp?NewsID=36372&sID=
4&Search=YES>
Hodges, Booker T. “What Happened During Federal Mediation: Part Two.” Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder. (12-24-03).
<www.spokesman-recorder.com/News/Article/Article.asp?NewsID=36636&sID=
4&Search=YES>
Howell, Lydia. “Who Protects Us From the Police: Redesigning the Civilian Review Authority.” Southside Pride. (July 2002).
<http://www.southsidepride.com/0207/News/Who_protects_us_from_the_police.html>
Hughes, Art. “Minneapolis Council Approves Budget Cuts.” Minnesota Public Radio. (3-13-03).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/03/13_hughesa_mpls
budget/>
Hughes, Art. “Two Internal Candidates are Finalists for New Minneapolis Police Chief.” Minnesota Public Radio. (12-10-03).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/12/10_hughesa_chief
finalists/>
Hughes, Art. “Police Chief Candidate Facing Opposition from City Council.” Minnesota Public Radio. (1-08-04).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/01/08_hughesa_police
chief/>
Hughes, Art. “McManus Confirmed as Minneapolis Police Chief.” Minnesota Public Radio. (1-16-04).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/02/17_hughesa_chief/>
Hughes, Art. “New
Minneapolis Police Chief Takes Over.” Minnesota Public Radio.
(2-17-04).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2004/01/16_hughesa_chiefconfrimed/>
Khoo, Michael. “Poll: Race Relations and the Police.” Minnesota Public Radio.
(11-05-01).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200111/05_khoom_profiling
poll/>
Olson, Dan. “A Tale of Two Police Departments.” Minnesota Public Radio. (11-23-03).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/11/24_olsond_chiefs/>
Olson, Dan. “Justice in Black and White: The
Justice Gap,” Minnesota Public Radio. (4-13-200).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200004/17_olsond_race/> 3/16/2004.
Olson, Rochelle, David Chanen, and Staff Writers. “Chief Olson's legacy is like his tenure: Complicated; As Minneapolis' top cop prepares to leave, he gets credit for a lower crime rate but criticism for being more politician than leader.” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Oct 27, 2003. pg. 1.A
Padilla, Howie. “Police to use more beanbag guns; Confrontations with the mentally ill
could be resolved without deadly force.” Star Tribune. Minneapolis, Minnesota : March 26, 2002.
Tai, Wendy S., Jon Jeter, and Staff Writers. “Minorities: Police abuse rises // Bouza denies charges; groups ask outside monitoring.” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Sep 27, 1988. pg. 01.B
Williams, Brandt. “Minneapolis Council Member Continues Anti-Violence Vigil.” Minnesota Public Radio. (7-31-03).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/07/31_williamsb_anti
crime/>
Williams, Brandt. “Report: Police Stop Minorities More Often Than Whites.” Minnesota Public Radio. (9-24-03).
<http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/24_williamsb_profilingreport/>
Interview with James Berry, 3/08/04
Lecture given by Michael Bischoff, 3/04
Interview with Michelle Gross, 3/30/04
Presentation by Jill Clark and Jill Waite, 3/02/04
[1] Lecture given by Michael Bischoff, 3/04
[2] Brunswick, Mark, Chris Graves, and Staff Writers. “Police departments' styles have roots in cities' past” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Jul 28, 1994. pg. 01.A
[3] "Drug Enforcement in Minority Communities: The Minneapolis Police Department," Police Executive Research Forum/National Institute of Justice, 1994, p. 7. Hereinafter PERF study.
[4]Tai, Wendy S., Jon Jeter, and Staff Writers. “Minorities: Police abuse rises // Bouza denies charges; groups ask outside monitoring.” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Sep 27, 1988. pg. 01.B
[5] Olson, Rochelle, David Chanen, and Staff Writers. “Chief Olson's legacy is like his tenure: Complicated; As Minneapolis' top cop prepares to leave, he gets credit for a lower crime rate but criticism for being more politician than leader.” Star Tribune: METRO Edition. Minneapolis, MN: Oct 27, 2003. pg. 1.A
[6] http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/AnalysisofFedMedAgree.asp
[7] Interview with Michelle Gross, 3/30/04
[8] Interview with James Berry, 3/08/04
[9] Wayne Schmidt, executive director of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, a Chicago-based police advocacy group, said both police and minority groups often feel disenfranchised from the criminal justice system, and clashes often result. Because of that, police have a moral and legal obligation to provide continued psychological testing and sensitivity testing for officers, Schmidt said. "A cop doesn't go to work with the idea of how many black people he can beat up that day. Usually these things start when someone says something to the cop that the cop doesn't like and he overreacts.
[10] Minneapolis Police Federation website - http://www.mpdfederation.com/
[11] CUAPB website - http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/HomePage.asp
[12] CUAPB website - http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/HomePage.asp
[13] HWR website - http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/
[14] Brunswick, Mark; Graves, Chris. Police departments' styles have roots in cities' past. Star Tribune. Minneapolis, Minnesota : July 28, 1994.
[15] Padilla, Howie. Police to use more beanbag guns;; Confrontations with the mentally ill could be resolved without deadly force. Star Tribune. Minneapolis, Minnesota : March 26, 2002.
[16] Interview: Michelle Gross, Communities United Against Police Brutality
[17] Human Rights Watch, “Shielded From Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States” <http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo84.htm> 3/16/2004.
[18] Communities United Against Police Brutality, “What We Believe” <http://www. charityadvantage.com/cuapb/WhatWeBelieve.asp> 3/18/2004.
[19] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/
[20] Hughes, Art. “Two Internal Candidates are Finalists for New Minneapolis Police Chief.” Minnesota Public Radio. (12-10-03).
[21] Williams, Brandt. “Minneapolis Council Member Continues Anti-Violence Vigil.” Minnesota Public Radio. (7-31-03).
[22] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/goals/
[23] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/outreach/
[24] Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo84.htm
[25] Williams, Brandt. “Minneapolis Council Member Continues Anti-Violence Vigil.” Minnesota Public Radio. (7-31-03).
[26] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.mpls.mn.us/council/ward9/state2003.asp
[27] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/ward3/SamuelsInaugural.asp
[28] Olson, Dan. “A Tale of Two Police Departments.” Minnesota Public Radio. (11-23-03).
[29] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/ward3/SamuelsInaugural.asp
[30] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.mpls.mn.us/council/ward9/state2003.asp
[31] City of Minneapolis: www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/about/internal-affairs.asp
[32] Howell, Lydia. “Who Protects Us From the Police: Redesigning the Civilian Review Authority.” Southside Pride. (July 2002).
[33] HRW: Shielded from Justice
[34] Anderson, Jr., G. R. “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell”. City Pages. 23.1139
(12-02-02).
[35] Ibid
[36] HRW: Shielded from Justice
[37] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/outreach/
[38] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/news/20031208Mediation.asp
[39] Anderson, Jr., G. R. “The Jordan Shuffle”. City Pages. 23.1138 (9-25-02).
[40] Anderson, Jr., G. R. “Off Beat”. City Pages. 24.1154 (1-15-03).
[41] HRW: Shielded from Justice
[42] City of Minnepolis:
http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/ward1/docs/Paulls-March-03-postscript.pdf
[43] Jill Waites and Jill Clarke: class lecture 3-02-04
[44] HRW: Shielded From Justice
[45] Anderson, Jr., G. R. “The Jordan Shuffle”. City Pages. 23.1138 (9-25-02).
[46] Hughes, Art. “New Minneapolis Police Chief Takes
Over.” Minnesota Public Radio. (2-17-04).
[47] Interview: Sharon Lubinski
[48] 1998 Human Rights Watch Report on Minneapolis Police Brutality
[49] Williams,
Brandt. "Police Stop Minorities More Often Than Whites,"
MPR Report.
<http://news.mpr.org/features/2003/09/24_williamsb_profilingreport/>
2/25/2004.
[50] ACLU, “Compelling Evidence of Racial Profiling and Double Standards of Enforcement in Minneapolis,” < http://archive.aclu.org/news/2000/w072300b.html> 3/18/2004.
[51] Olson, Dan. “Justice in Black and White: The Justice Gap,” Minnesota Public Radio. (4-13-200). <http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200004/17_olsond_race/> 3/16/2004.
[52] Minneapolis Police CODEFOR Unit, “2000 CODEFOR Report By Chief Robert Olson,” < http://www.ci.mpls.mn.us/citywork/police/stats/codefor/ 2000_CODEFOR_Report_by_Chief_Robert_Olson.pdf> 3/18/2004.
[53] Minnesota Public Radio, “Poll: Race Relations and the Police,” <http:// news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200111/05_khoom_profilingpoll/> 3/16/2004.
[54] Chanen, David. “Data Deepens Racial Profiling Divide.” Minneapolis Star Tribune. (1-21-01). <http://www.legis.state.wi.us /senate/sen04/news/articles/art2001-8.htm> 3/21/2004.
[55] National Lawyers Guild – Minnesota Chapter, “Driving While Black in Spotlight,” <http://www.nlgminnesota.org/newsletter/NLGNews_05_01.pdf> 3/18/2004.
[56]ACLU, “Compelling Evidence of Racial Profiling and Double Standards of Enforcement in Minneapolis,” < http://archive.aclu.org/news/2000/w072300b.html> 3/18/2004.
[57] Anderson, Jr., G.R. “Living in America,” City Pages. (10-01-03) <http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1191/article11535.asp > 3/22/2004.