Minneapolis
Police-Community Conflict
Prospective
Resolutions
JPST
470: Conflict Resolution
Dr.
Cris Toffolo
May
2004
Elyse
Rau
Liz
Stone
Maggie
Sweeney (Email:
socialists_us AT yahoo.com)
Conclusion……………………………..………………………...23
Bibliography………………………………..…………………..24
Introduction
The
Minneapolis police-community conflict is one that involves and impacts an
extensive number of individuals, organizations, and institutions. It is a conflict that demands a comprehensive
and multifaceted approach to its resolution or transformation. In order to best identify the key components
and efforts in such a resolution, it is important to recognize the main aspects
and problems at the heart of the conflict. While police misconduct is often and
necessarily closely associated with the conflict, and is what has brought much
attention to Minneapolis, there is much more that needs to be addressed. Police brutality is a component of the
conflict that functions to highlight the systematic and long standing problems
that must be addressed in any resolution.
It is an area of great concern that must be addressed, both in the
immediate present as well as in a long-term perspective that will identify and
address the underlying issues at play and perpetuating the pattern and culture
of violence that persists. We have
identified a few main categories that exemplify and encompass the problems that
need to be addressed and included in any comprehensive conflict resolution.
The
lack of trust and understanding between members of the community and members of
the police force is central to the roots and perpetuation of the conflict. If police officers do not trust or
understand some of the basic challenges and mentalities of the members of the
communities they patrol, there is more of a chance of them feeling threatened
or defensive and using excessive force or taking inappropriate and unnecessary
measures. Furthermore, the community
will not feel that the officers really have the best interest of the community
in mind as they have not expressed or acted with any understanding of the true
concerns or fears the community has. If
the community members do not trust or understand the challenges and responsibilities
of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), the officers will not have the
respect needed to carryout their job.
If the community members have a clear understanding of how to behave in
an encounter with a police officer and what limitations and powers the officers
have, it is possible to minimize the likelihood that excessive force will be
used or that they have the information needed to take the most effective
action.
The
building of trust and understanding leads to new and beneficial relationships
allowing people to identify shared interests and work towards a resolution of
mutual gain. It helps to move away from
the mentality of “us vs. them” and a zero-sum game where only one party can
win, and where success comes with the defeat or loss of the other. Growing in
understanding of the other side and the resulting relationship helps to
recognize the humanity of all involved and to thus bring some balance to an
asymmetrical power situation. Building
a level of trust between the community and the MPD is not an easy task to
accomplish. The history of this
relationship, involving violence, abuse, and mistrust, is very much still
present and has never been alleviated by an apology or recognition of
fault. According to Gleason Glover of
the Urban League, “The whole issue of police brutality is nothing new to the
city of Minneapolis. It almost gives the impression that if you are black and
poor, it doesn't really matter if you lose your life. The police did not say
'we are sorry.' There was no remorse at
all!”[1]
This
lack of understanding and trust is exacerbated by the lack of accountability
and the fact that if, as some argue, there are only a “few bad apples,” they
often remain or return to the force with little to no punitive actions. There are currently many loopholes in the
existing systems that are intended to hold police officers accountable to both
department policy and human rights standards.
If and when officers are disciplined, the decisions are often reversed
in an appeal and arbitration process.
In a 1998 Human Rights Watch Interview with former Chief Olson, he
stated that the arbitration process was perhaps the greatest barrier he faces
in his efforts to hold police officers accountable for misconduct.[2] The institutions for receiving complaints
of police brutality, such as the Civilian Review Authority and the Internal
Affairs Unit of the MPD, are neither very effective nor well trusted. There is also a lack of MPD leadership
holding the officers accountable. Human
Rights Watch states in their report on police brutality in Minneapolis that,
“There is no substitute for police leadership to make clear to new as well as
veteran officers that human rights violations are not acceptable. The highest-ranking commanders must also
hold to account superior officers who are found to have ignored or tolerated
abuses committed by officers under their command.”[3] Altering structural obstacles to peace, such
as accountability and official policies, as well as personal obstacles
generated by lack of trust and understanding are important to keep in mind when
looking to develop a conflict resolution proposal.
Applying
a theoretical perspective of conflict resolution to the particular
characteristics of this conflict is also important as it provides a framework
with which to analyze and lay out a proposal towards building peace. A theoretical understanding of this
conflict's dynamics also helps to define the challenges and strengths of the
current situation and allows us to place it in the context of the range of
conflicts that have drawn attention and analysis as the field of Conflict
Resolution develops.
Recognizing
the strengths and benefits of a multi-track approach to diplomacy and conflict
resolution, we find this a critical and necessary approach to the Minneapolis
police-community conflict. A
resolution, or even the process of conflict transformation, must encompass
actors and actions on all levels, as it is a conflict that comes from and is
influenced by all levels of society.
Our
multi-pronged approach is compatible with the multi-track diplomacy theory,
except rather than global, regional, or local organizations, we are dealing
with formal state and city institutions and neighborhood groups. We can liken
federal or state policy with first track diplomacy, as it entails formal
political processes and has the ability to create legal, binding arbitration.
This might also include regular government services such as the Citizen Review
Authority or the department of Internal Affairs, as these are both legitimate
institutions within the existing organizations of City and Police. The federal
mediation may also be considered first track diplomacy as the mediator was
originally from the federal government, but could also be considered
second-track since any agreement settled upon has not been officially
considered binding.
Second
track diplomacy could be considered the court system that is currently being
used in the federal mediation case and perhaps will continue to be used in
other cases. The courts are a good example of this, as they are not bound by
some of the political or economic pressures that hamper the city or police
action. They are also considered a non-affiliate, unbiased (theoretically)
third party.
Third-track
diplomacy is evident in the community organizations that have sprung up around
this issue including the most prominent group working on the issue, Communities
United Against Police Brutality, though there are also numerous other groups
are involved at a variety of levels. These grassroots groups all sprang out of
neighborhood activists seeking to improve police conduct or the general
livability of Minneapolis. They are
composed, for the most part, of people who have either been directly involved
in the conflict, i.e. a victim of police brutality, or those who have witnessed
misconduct or experienced it secondhand. These people have direct knowledge of
the community and are more in tune with general neighborhood sentiment.
Understanding
the power structures at play in this conflict is another key to being able to
formulate the most efficient and fitting resolution. Specifically, it is important to recognize the significant
asymmetry of power that exists between the community and the police force. This asymmetry is also found in the relationships
between individual members of the community and individual officers when there
is an encounter in the streets or neighborhood. The MPD not only has the power of being an organized and official
city department, but it also has the power of intimidation, force, and
political clout. The power of the
community, organized greatly around issues of police brutality, is dominantly
grassroots and though it is highly motivated, it is still lacking the formal
organization and recognition that the MPD holds. The community is working against established regulations,
processes, and practices greatly upheld by the system and parties in
power. It is important to acknowledge
this power structure and we will address methods of balancing and
redistributing power in order to make significant steps in transforming or
resolving the conflict.
The
“Interdependence Gap” outlined by John Paul Lederach in the book, People Building Peace, is another
relevant theory to apply to enhance an understanding of the relevance of
fostering different types of relationships.
Lederach looks at the power structures that exist and identifies the
importance for building relationships in both a vertical capacity (across
divisions that exist between groups with different levels of power), and in a
horizontal capacity (across divisions within groups and with similar levels of
or access to power). Lederach argues
that there is a greater lack of vertical capacity in most peace building
efforts. However, we would pose that
there is both a need for improvement in vertical capacity as well as
horizontal. The vertical capacity can
be seen in police officers attending a variety of meetings and gatherings in
different communities and partaking in community activities on occasion. Emphasizing a continuation of building and
improving these relationships and partnerships across levels of power is
beneficial, as “no one activity and no one level will be able to deliver and
sustain peace on its own”[4]
Equally
significant to the peace building efforts in Minneapolis is the gap of
horizontal capacity. Critical to
numerous aspects of the conflict is a lack of “constructive understanding and
dialogue across the lines of division in a society.”[5] As we learned, this division is one of the
greater challenges that faced the community in the process of the Federal
Mediation. There are great divides
within the community, as well as within the MPD and the city officials,
regarding which demands need to be met, how the conflict is seen, and what is
the best way of accomplishing or achieving an end - a resolution. Furthermore, the lack of horizontal capacity
can be seen in the gap between practices and official policies of the MPD. By increasing the horizontal capacity of the
groups involved in this conflict, many obstacles could be challenged that are
challenging the peace building efforts being made.
Lederach
identifies and lays out another insufficiency in the typical peacebuilding
framework that he calls the “Process-Structure Gap”. This gap points out the tendency to see peace agreements and
settlements as ends, rather than a means.
Lederach argues that we need “to conceptualize peace as
process-structure,” so that we can move away from “a myopic focus on agreements
and events and toward a commitment of embracing the permanency of relationship
building…when relationship becomes the center what remains permanent is not a
given form but the capacity to encounter and adapt.”[6] After the signing of the Federal Mediation
Agreement early this year, it is important that it not be forgotten and that
people recognize the agreement is only a beginning step in a long process
towards transforming the conflict and building peace, not the end goal or
success. “Peacebuilding requires us to work at constructing an infrastructure
to support a process of desired change, and change is permanent.”[7] The mediation agreement is a means to help
encourage, facilitate, and demand the systematic and infrastructure changes
that are necessary.
There
are many obstacles to be faced by the parties and individuals involved in this
conflict. However, despite all of the
tension, conflict, and opposition that may exist, there is an underlying
similar interest held by most anybody involved: the improvement of life,
increased safety, and respect between Minneapolis communities. Police officers, city council members, and
community members of racial minorities or majorities all would benefit from
decreased crime, more livable neighborhoods, increased understanding, and
improved relationships and services.
The theory of principled negotiation, with a focus on interests and
mutual gain is a key to the settlement of this conflict. There is much to be said for facing the
problem and not each other, because when you look at the problem, the common ground
that is shared among the different parties is more apparent and can be used to
everyone’s advantage. Though the party
lines are strictly defined in the view of many, there is a gray area as police
officers and city officials are often also members of the community. The greater this overlap is - increased, for
example, through proposed new recruiting methods and diversification of the MPD
- the easier it will be to overcome the lines of division and to recognize and
work for mutual gain.
Finally,
as was pointed out in discussing the process-structure gap, building peace in
this conflict situation is a process, and may be best identified by conflict transformation rather than conflict resolution. Before any final settlement takes place, there needs to be a
transformation of the conflict: context, structures, institutions, actors,
issues, and personal and group opinions need to be changed if we are able to
work cooperatively and constructively on resolving the conflict. As it currently stands, there are many
underlying issues that need to be addressed before we can meet at the table to
discuss a resolution.
To begin to resolve the Minneapolis Police-Community conflict, it is
necessary to understand what steps have already been taken. We will first consider three approaches that
are currently being undertaken in the conflict: federal mediation, pursuit of a
civil suit against the City of Minneapolis, and community partnership
initiatives in existence. We will
examine how these efforts are working, and will analyze them in light of some
theories entailed in conflict resolution as outlined earlier. After examining these three current efforts,
we will then outline some proposals for further action and discuss how these
strategies might be implemented to help resolve this conflict.
As discussed earlier in our paper, a
federal mediator was invited into the community to help arbitrate an agreement
between the police department and the community. The local team involved in the mediation included members of the
community representing a range of organizations, police administrators and
officers, and a city council member.
The idea behind this gathering was to allow all parties involved to have
an equal say in the creation of a document outlining changes within the police
department, creating an equal partnership and allowing for a more symmetrical
power between the police and the community.
This symmetry of power is important in resolving conflict as it allows
for all parties to take part on an equal basis. The federal mediation to some extent also exemplified the idea of
multitrack diplomacy, as elected officials sat alongside citizens, and police
officers communicated directly with chiefs.
This gathering was controversial,
however, in that it could not include all interested parties. Allegations of city influence in the choice
of community participants meant that not all who wanted to be involved were, essentially
continuing the sense of powerlessness that some community members have felt in
the conflict. Although this mediation
was attempted to bring both parties to an agreement, its effect was less than
hoped for by some members in the community due to exclusion.
Communities United Against Police
Brutality (CUAPB) is one group that felt particularly left out from the
agreement. Their work to combat police
brutality is extensive, and it is not unexpected that they would have a major
role in the federal mediation agreement, since they are currently the only
community organization that is dedicated specifically to the issue of police
misconduct. Through “community meetings
and canvassing”[8] they
developed a list of community members’ concerns that should be address and
resolved in the mediation. To their
disappointment, “people on the community team were either unaware of the
extensive list of demands from the community or chose not to include those
demands in the final agreement.”[9]
Aside from omission of community groups
and some specific demands, another challenge to the implementation of the
agreement is funding. At the time of
writing, there were no particular means of financing the agreement, so any
extra trainings or attempts to “institute an active recruitment and retention
program”[10] targeting
minorities are currently not funded by the regular budget. To counteract this, the Minneapolis Police
Department (MPD) and the Police Community Relations Council will “seek funds
from the City Council, grants, or other sources.” [11] These efforts, however, are not guaranteed
to provide sufficient finances to fulfill the agreement, effectively allowing
the MPD not to fulfill this agreement due to lack of funding. Another issue with the final agreement is
the fact that compliance is voluntary in that there are no direct, immediate
consequences for failing to implement the agreement: “If the parties are unable to resolve the dispute on their own,
any party may contact the Community Relations Service (CRS) of the United
States Department of Justice and request that the CRS convene mediation
facilitate a resolution of the dispute.”
This failure to include any means of
reinforcement for the mediation has the potential to transform the federal
mediation from a binding document into a community relations agreement with no
real power other than personal interest on the part of the police chief. This lack of formality to the final
agreement means that the symmetry being sought is not found in the document –
communities are not allowed much more power as they lack sufficient avenues to
enforce the agreement.
This does not mean that the federal
mediation is necessarily a failure; only that it will require continued
oversight and advocacy if it is to be an effective tool. It is also acknowledged that this agreement is
only one step of the process. As one
participant in the process said, “I believe that the mediation agreement is a
positive step in the right direction…the mediation agreement is not perfect,
but it is certainly better than nothing. I say let's give it a chance to work
before criticizing it.”[12]
The Federal Class Action Lawsuit
Feeling that the federal mediation
agreement fell short of community expectations, activists and members of
Communities United Against Police Brutality are working to create a class
action lawsuit against the Minneapolis Police Department. Led by Minneapolis attorneys Jill Waite and
Jill Clarke, community activists hope to reach the goals that were not obtained
through federal mediation. Some of the
many problems the Communities United Against Police Brutality found missing
from the federal mediation resolution include the lack of neutral
investigations of police brutality, police accountability for time and
activities, independent investigations of situations in which deadly force was
used, adequate training for making stops based on actions rather than general
characteristics, and the failure of police to take cross complaints[13].
Leaders of the federal class action
lawsuit against the Minneapolis Police Department hope to bring accountability
to Minneapolis Police and reduce the amount of abuse police officers get away
with. They are not after monetary
compensation; instead their focus is to bring about social change. Michelle Gross, a leader in Communities
United Against Police Brutality, is very hopeful in the success of the federal
class action lawsuit, believing that it may be more effective because, unlike
the federal mediation agreement, it is in “an arena
that the city cannot control.”[14] The city cannot influence who is able to
participate as they did in the federal mediation. They also have less power in the consequences or ruling of the
lawsuit.
There are people working on many
levels of the community to resolve the conflict between the Minneapolis
community and the Minneapolis Police Department. The federal class action lawsuit attempts to find justice through
legal terms. This is an example of how
multi-track diplomacy is used to try to combat conflict. Communities United Against Police Brutality
is trying to bridge the gap between the people and the government through the
federal court system. With similar
goals, different people of the community attempt to find resolution to this
painful and enduring conflict.
The federal class action lawsuit
will have many consequences regardless of its success or failure. Jill Waite and Jill Clarke argue that there
are positive implications whether or not the lawsuit is successful.[15] The lawsuit, which hopes to collect more
than five hundred affidavits, is an effective tool for empowering the people of
Minneapolis. Victims of police
brutality seldom have the chance to tell their story. Through the affidavits, victims are listened to and play a vital
role in the future of Minneapolis communities in regard to the way they are
treated by Minneapolis police. The
lawsuit also brings further attention of the police brutality problem in
Minneapolis to the federal government, the public, and the media. Whether or not the lawsuit is successful,
the spotlight will be on Minneapolis and the people will be heard.
The federal class action lawsuit is
one way Minneapolis communities are attempting to bridge what John Paul
Lederach defines as the “interdependence gap.”
The problem with the federal mediation agreement was that the community
felt they were inadequately represented in the communication between both
sides. Although some communication
occurred between grassroots leaders and higher level leaders, these discussions
did not necessarily turn into lasting relationships. CUAPB argues that the city chose which groups would be allowed to
play a role, and as a result the agreement lacks vertical capacity.
In order to maximize the amount of understanding between the
community and the Minneapolis Police Department, there should be an effort to
build relationships on multiple levels.
The federal class action lawsuit attempts to bridge this gap. It allows grassroots leaders to play a role,
and it also includes leaders from a federal level, surpassing what the
mediation agreement did on both ends of the spectrum. Although it does provide for more vertical capacity, the act of
suing the City of Minneapolis in order to force reform on the MPD may actually
inhibit understanding between the two sides.
This is where Lederach’s “process-structure gap” plays a role. All those involved in the conflict must
understand that peace is both a process and a structure. The federal class action lawsuit attempts to
change the structure of the Minneapolis Police Department, but changing the
mental aspects of the conflict will be a process based on relationship building
and understanding.[16]
There is some new information and definite signs of hope in the
conflict between the Minneapolis community and the Minneapolis Police Department. Leaders of Communities United Against Police
Brutality met with Minneapolis Police Chief McManus about three weeks ago. Although they did not agree upon any specific
compromises, the McManus agreed to meet with them quarterly. This is a very large step in the
communication process between the Minneapolis Police Department and the
community. Although communication is
increasing, Communities United Against Police Brutality has seen little or no
improvement in the issue of police brutality in Minneapolis. They still receive several new police
brutality cases every week and are continuing to work hard at supporting these
victims.[17]
There are also some new breakthroughs in the federal class action
lawsuit. The federal judge recently
granted the community’s request to add four more named plaintiffs, bringing the
total amount of named plaintiffs to nine.
According to Jill Clarke, this is very good news because it allows her
to expose a wide variety of police malpractices that go far beyond the use of
excessive force. In the federal class
action lawsuit, the community will be able to uncover the following corrupt
practices in the Minneapolis Police Department: the overall practice of
excessive force, the attempt by police to file false charges against victims of
police brutality as a way of avoiding accountability, inadequate system of
reviewing police brutality complaints, the lack of punishment for officers who
perpetrate the use of excessive force, and the practice of intimidation as well
as retaliation in victims’ efforts to file police brutality complaints.[18]
In addition to this new ability to expose the police, there has
been good progress on neighborhood canvassing and writing affidavits. These are intricate but important parts of
the federal class action lawsuit. The
lawyers and leaders of Communities United Against Police Brutality are now more
hopeful than ever in regards to the federal class action lawsuit. They hope the federal courts will force
accountability on the Minneapolis Police Department and pave the way for
structural adjustment within the department.
While there are efforts being made
and actions being taken on federal and state levels, the conflict between the
Minneapolis Police Department and the civilian community is also being
addressed on a local, grassroots level.
These efforts address the problem from a more preventative and proactive
angle that focuses on the building of relationships and ownership within the
community as well as the improvement of relationships, communication and trust
with the MPD. These relationships, in
turn, center their efforts greatly on the common interest of improving the
safety and livability of their neighborhoods.
While
in attendance at a community meeting in Minneapolis, the Hawthorn Huddle, a member of the community took the opportunity
to introduce himself and his perspective on the root of the problems facing
their community. In rhetoric and a
voice more powerful than can be reproduced or captured here he stated that,
though improving, there was a great lack of ownership and belonging in the
community: Do you ever wonder why
people walk out of a store or along the street and drop litter or vandalize in
other ways? Why are kids shooting at
each other on the streets? He
challenged everyone to acknowledge that even with all the work being done and
services being offered in the community, there are people who it is not
reaching.
Addressing
these basic needs and improving the livability of the neighborhoods in
Minneapolis is the focus of a number of already existing organizations and
institutions. Whether directly or indirectly, in a large or small way, these
organizations have had and continue to play a role in the Minneapolis
police-community conflict and in building of relationships among those
involved.
Examples
of such organizations include the Neighborhood Revitalization Project (NRP),
which empowers and enables local community members to make decisions and design
a neighborhood action plan to address issues and concerns in their
community. These plans are used for
things such as meeting their community’s “housing, safety, economic
development, recreation, health, social service, environment and transportation
needs. They build a foundation for their future by organizing residents,
gathering information, prioritizing needs, brainstorming solutions and
implementing the Neighborhood Action Plan that they develop.”[19] Another example of such an organization is
one of the city’s community outreach programs, Community Crime
Prevention/Safety for Everyone (CCP/SAFE).
This organization is based on teams of MPD officers and crime prevention
specialists who “provide educational materials and programs, develop working
relationships with the community and assist residents in reducing the
opportunity for crime and in solving problems in the community.”[20]
Meetings
also take place in different neighborhoods or precincts that involve both
police officers as well as community leaders and residents. The Police-Advisory
Council meetings that take place monthly in each precinct offer a place and way
for community members to voice concerns as well as to hear updates and concerns
of the MPD. These meetings not only
create working relationships between members of the community and the police
force, but they also help to create space for each side to gain a better
understanding of the challenges and main agendas of the other.
Finally,
there are dozens of neighborhood groups that gather and organize community
events of all sizes and scales as well as share concerns and information among
neighbors. These community groups,
though not reaching all of the members of the community, are a good start to
creating the sense of ownership and belonging that is argued to be necessary in
making crime levels go down and livability increase. The Hawthorn Huddle is one of these community groups for the
Hawthorn neighborhood in Minneapolis.
It is an impressive example of the potential that community groups and
organizing can have as it networks and connects concerned neighborhood
professionals and community leaders together to build a coalition working on
numerous different levels and initiatives to make their community a better
place to live.
While there are currently a good
number of organizations and efforts that intentionally or unintentionally
foster positive relationships and trust among the communities, police
department, and city, there is more that could be done. Keeping in mind the restrictions and
limitations of funding and people’s time commitments, it is most logical to
expand these efforts using already existing organizations or initiatives.
One means that could be utilized is
the recently established Police Community Relations Council (PCRC) that
according many is the core of the Federal Mediation Agreement. “At the heart of the agreement is the
creation of a 30-member Police Community Relations Council, which will include
18 members selected by the citizen's group, plus 12 members appointed by the
police chief. The committee will work
directly with the department and will become its major link to the 'diverse
communities' in the city, leaders said.”[21] As outlined in section 14 of the Mediation
Agreement, the PCRC is made up of members of both the community and police
force and is assigned with functions that will provide “a forum for ongoing
communication between MPD and the community regarding matters of public safety
and the public’s faith and confidence in the MPD.” These forums and dialogues resulting from the activity of the
PCRC would be a place at which both the MPD and Unity Community Mediation Team
may present information covering topics such as race, ethnicity and other forms
of diversity, the use of deadly force, and questions or concerns of the public
regarding specific incidents.[22]
These
forums would follow the model and example presented in the mediation process:
the sharing of personal or group feelings, fears, perceptions, perspectives and
challenges that helped to build understanding and relationships that resulted
in an unexpected and surprising camaraderie, and eventually agreement. “At one point that afternoon, while the City
Council's Public Safety and Regulatory Services committee was considering
approval of the 24-page document, street activist Spike Moss and MPD union
leader John Delmonico stood arm in arm in the council chambers.”[23]
Information
regarding the forums could be spread through the existing neighborhood groups
and organizations concerned with related issues. The more the community is aware of the existence and function of
the PCRC, the more involvement will increase and the function and effectiveness
of the PCRC can improve. Additionally,
information regarding the Mediation Agreement, the PCRC and its forums can be
provided through the existing complaint processes, as this will reach an
audience of people that will have direct insight and input on the situation and
conflict. Information, particularly
regarding rights and responsibilities in situations of arrest and in the use of
force, should also be distributed and shared through other means. Doing this
will reach the greater population and members of the community that may not be
aware of these rights or responsibilities (of both the MPD and themselves) or
those who would not be likely or able to attend PCRC meetings or forums. Use of
churches, community centers, and bus stops are options to place available
literature and summaries.
Another
strong way to improve and build community-police relations and to focus
together on the problem and mutual interests is through community
policing. This could involve
empowering community members to police their own neighborhoods. This has already taken form in activities
such as the “Watch Force” in existence.
In the past, this effort has mainly relied on neighborhood observation
and reporting of suspicious activities directly, but now efforts with new
technology are revolutionizing this tactic.
Use of the internet and email has allowed citizens to receive and report
on recent crimes and is more likely to be used since it allows for anonymity
for tipsters.
Citizen Observer, a Minnesota-based firm,
is leading this technological innovation to integrate police and community
members in about 130 communities around the Midwest and in Florida. Fairmount, MN Sergeant Corey Klanderud is
supportive of this new initiative, reporting “This technology is going to help
us have more eyes and ears in the community."[24] Aside from website reports, direct email is
also being used and has shown to be effective in Medina, WA. Two years ago
there chief of police Michael Knapp “acted on an idea from a resident to start
up a Community E-Lert program which send e-mails to 1,200 subscribers. ‘It changes policing because we involve the
community in a partnership - in addressing the criminal problems of our city…
When you do that you're going to become more efficient.’"[25] What’s more, this approach of building
police-community cooperation and collaboration has the potential to be
free! “Often, the service costs local police little or nothing, because a
community business will routinely cover the costs in exchange for promotional
considerations and links on Web pages.”[26]
Aside from informal relationships, moves
have been made in some departments to “civilianize” the police force. This entails “hiring civilians to do the
jobs cops formerly did so as to free patrol officers to work the streets.”[27] By empowering the citizens, you make the
conflict more symmetrical – the police force is made to share the power and
responsibility of policing the community by assisting the community in its
self-policing tactics. This would
require cooperation between the force and the citizenry, where citizens could
receive training and officers could build relationships with citizens. This best represents a combination of track
two and track three diplomacy, due to the formal nature of the police
department and their relationship with local nonprofit or established community
organizations, but also these efforts may include the grassroots movement of
citizens to increase their own personal level of involvement. This also helps close the process-structure
gap as community policing efforts highlight the matter of the communities'
interdependence and encourages collaboration across party lines. These efforts would likely have to originate
from the department itself, simply because it may require formal training of
community members, but allowing the police department to hold responsibility in
this effort will allow them to work more effectively, as they know best their
resources, strengths, and abilities.
This type of operative may require what could be considered track one
diplomacy, meaning city officials may have to earmark funding or support for
the effort, but it is still more local efforts which will make it work.
Administrative reform is another method
available for changing police behavior.
Rather than working from within the community or lower ranks of the
police department, this approach focuses on top-down influence to reshape the
department. Transformation of the
conflict is often necessary to be able to formulate a resolution:
"In the
view of the committee, the road to police reform is largely an internal one,
featuring training, supervision, internal inspections, performance measures,
and policy making. At this level, controlling police behavior is a management
problem…We
have emphasized internal management efforts because ultimately processes have
to be put into motion inside the organization to make those changes. In the end, these processes make up the
“transmission belt” by which external pressures translate into internal change,
and in our judgment, they should be the central focus of reform efforts.
Without engaging these, most externally imposed solutions to lawfulness
problems will not be very effective."[28]
This
reform could be a vital part of changing the department in the way it can
affect both written and unwritten policies.
An effective change in the department has the potential to transform the
culture and institution of the police force.
This administrative reform can come through elected leaders or through
administrators within the police department.
One drawback that elected officials have
in their efforts to reform the department is the fact that these officials have
limited power, and their reforms are only as lasting as their tenure; following
administrations can easily undo any advancements accomplished. At the turn of the 20th century
the United States was struggling with a number of police departments whose
legitimacy suffered from outstanding records of misconduct. In some instances, elected officials strived
to enact change, but “attempts to straighten out the police lasted only as long
as the municipal administrations,” which in many cases was only one term –
certainly not long enough to enact lasting reforms.[29] Political officials’ distance from the
department also means that they may be unable to “institutionalize [their]
ideals,” and as a result are unable to significantly affect the police culture
that allows for and accepts police misconduct.[30]
Those within the administration of the
police department or force are really the people who have an impressive amount
of power. They hold a lot of influence
in the department and can decide whether or not to set new guidelines, change
trainings, enforce regulations, or tolerate corruption. In the 1960’s New York City plainclothes
officer Frank Serpico began to report on police misconduct. Receiving no response from city officials,
he took his story to a reporter for the New York Times. The ensuing publicity pressured the city and
ultimately resulted in the replacement of the Police Commissioner with NYPD
veteran Patrick Murphy. “He rewarded
cops who turned in corrupt or brutal colleagues and punished those who,
although personally honest, looked the other way when they learned of
misconduct…Murphy used his three and a half years in office to create an
environment that loudly and clearly condemned abusive police conduct, those who
engage in it, and – equally important – those who tolerate it.”[31]
This new ideology in the department
lasted much longer than Murphy’s term, evident when one of his successors,
Commissioner Benjamin Ward, responded to a 1985 episode in which police had
injured a suspected drug dealer: “Ward
summoned 327 senior officers to police headquarters in lower Manhattan. He read them the riot act, then fired the
entire chain of command involved in the incident…”[32] These two examples show how having a
reformer working at the top level in the department increases the likelihood
that the department will be able to change as they redraw the boundaries of
acceptable behavior and influence the culture through this behavior. Their actions last longer than their
personal presence as successful reform of ideology persists even without their
presence. These administrative
reformers cannot act alone, however; they are dependent on the support and
influence of outside actors to strengthen their voice, most notably public
officials or even the public itself.
“A recent study
of two precincts in the Bronx shows that tough policing and increased
complaints don't have to go hand in hand. Rob Davis and a colleague at the Vera
Institute of Justice, a criminal- justice think tank, studied the 42nd and 44th
precincts. Both experienced the same dramatic drop in crime as the rest of the
city did, but saw a drop, instead of an increase, in citizen complaints.
Researchers concluded the key reason was the two precinct commanders, who put a
premium on respecting the community and took complaints seriously enough to
discipline officers.”[33]
Probably one of the strengths about
administrative reform is the financial aspect.
Most of the components or techniques necessary to institute reform are
already in place and just need to be enacted or applied – internal review, for
example, or training and hiring standards.
These just need to be strengthened in many cases, although other times a
restructuring of the department is called for, and this may take a significant
budget increase, but overall this strategy is one of the more
cost-effective. This reform will likely
result in a transformation of the police department – perhaps its official
policies but eventually will create a shift in the officers’ attitudes
themselves. This attitude shift will
lead to a behavioral change as well, and tensions between the community and the
police force will almost certainly decline.
The Minneapolis Police Department has recently undergone a change in
administration, with new police Chief McManus replacing Olson. While it may be possible that McManus will
be able to reform some of the departmental policies, such as the internal
review process, further observation is needed to see how effective this current
change is.
“Media power is political power.” [34]
The media has an extremely large
amount of power over the people in the United States. They present people with stories about what is going on in the
world. Like in any other country, the
stories they show are affected by their own perceptions and biases in each
situation. This is inevitable as anyone
who tells a story will always present it based upon their own perceptions. It only becomes a problem when the spectrum
of perceptions and opinions is limited.
In 1983, fifty companies controlled ninety percent of the mass media in
the United States. The mass media
includes newspapers, magazines, television and radio stations, books, records,
movies, videos, wire services, and photo agencies. The situation was much different in the year 2000, in which only
six corporations owned and operated ninety percent of the media in the United
States.1
In his book The Media Monopoly, Bagdikian argues that media power is political power because it has
control over the minds of the public.
Because the media is such an effective tool to get a point across to a
large number of people, it would work to the Minneapolis communities’ benefit
to target this as an important means of promoting police accountability and
peace. Although the mainstream media is
controlled by corporate giants, the way to get coverage would be to first
target other sources of media and then persistently force the community’s
perspective on the mainstream media.
Other sources of media may include local newspapers such as The City Pages and radio stations not
owned by large corporations. An
increase of protests, lobbying, and public events would help attract attention
to the problems of the Minneapolis Police Department via the media.
More coverage in the media would
affect the conflict greatly. Although
many in the police department feel that the media is too critical of the
police, little is shown in mainstream media about situations of police
brutality that do not result in death.
An increase in coverage would put pressure on Minneapolis police
officers to treat people with respect and refrain from using excessive
force. Through the use of negative
publicity, the police officers would be coerced into acting respectful. Although the ultimate goal is conversion,
coercion is still a large step in resolving the conflict.[35]
In addition to the media being used
as a scare tactic to brutal police officers, it would also serve as a tool to
help balance power between the Minneapolis Police Department and Minneapolis
communities. Currently, the Minneapolis
Police Department has complete power over the communities, and a more objective
and revealing media would provide some power to the people. A change in power structures may result in
the Minneapolis Police Department being more willing to negotiate goals that
the community feels are important to the resolution of this conflict.
In conclusion, we found that
although a number of efforts to resolve this conflict are currently being
undertaken, these efforts fail to address all of the issues surrounding
successful conflict resolution, and do not address the transformation of the
conflict, one of the issues we identified as crucial to resolving this
particular conflict. Without including
further strategies that consciously address these underlying theories it is
likely that the Minneapolis Police-Community conflict will continue. It is our suggestion that further action is
taken in a multitude of areas - not only do behaviors need to be addressed, but
structures and institutions themselves need to be reshaped. In our opinion this cannot be done with
punitive measures, but only with proactive cooperation and collaboration
involving all parties involved.
Websites
CUAPB.
“Community Demands to be raised in Federal Mediation” - Draft 3, 10/12/02, <http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/images/Federal%20Mediation%20Community%20Demands.pdf>
CUAPB. “An Analysis of the Minneapolis Federal
Mediation Agreement.”
<http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/AnalysisofFedMedAgree.asp>
Human Rights
Watch: “Shielded from Justice, Police Brutality and Accountability in the
United States.” June, 1998.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm>
Neighborhood
Revitalization Project <www.nrp.org>
City of
Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/outreach/
“Federal
Mediation Aggreement” <http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/2003-meetings/20031215/docs/01_Mediation_Memorandum_Agreement.pdf
>
Articles
Anderson, Jr.,
G.R. “Agreement at last,” City Pages. (12-10-03). <http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1201/article11724.asp>
Hawley,
David. “Police, public agree to pact”
Pioneer Press. (12-05-03).
<http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/local/7417349.htm>
Hodges, Booker
T.. “What happened in federal mediation?” Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder.
1/21/2004
<http://spokesman-recorder.com/news/Article/Article.asp?NewsID=37548&sID=13>
Marks,
Alexandra. “NYPD as lab for reducing
police brutality.” The Christian Science Monitor May 13, 1999.
Paton, Dean. “New police tool: neighborhood watch by
Web.” The Christian Science Monitor May 05, 2003. May 14, 2004 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0505/p01s03-ussc.html>.
Skogan, Wesley
G., and Meares, Tracey L.. "Lawful
Policing." The Annals for the
American Academy. May 2004
Skolnick, Jerome
H., and Fyfe, James J.. Above the Law:
Police and the Excessive Use of Force.
New York: The Free Press, 1993.
Books
Bagdikian, Ben H.. The Media Monopoly, Sixth Edition.
Beacon Press, 2000.
Lederach, John
Paul. People Building Peace. “Justpeace - The Challenge of the 21st
Century.” The Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1999.
Sharp,
Gene. The Dynamics of Nonviolent
Action. Gene Sharp, 1973.
Return to the Table of Contents for this Project
[1] Human Rights Watch: “Shielded from
Justice, Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States.” June,
1998.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/index.htm>
[2] HRW: Shielded from Justice
[3] Ibid
[4] Lederach, John Paul. People Building Peace. “Justpeace - The Challenge of the 21st
Century.” The Netherlands: European
Centre for Conflict Resolution, 1999. (p 30)
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid, (p 35)
[7] Ibid, (p 34)
[8] CUAPB. “Community Demands to be raised in Federal Mediation” - Draft 3, October 12, 2002, http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/images/Federal%20Mediation%20Community%20Demands.pdf 5/10/04
[9] CUAPB. “An
Analysis of the Minneapolis Federal Mediation Agreement.”
http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/AnalysisofFedMedAgree.asp 5/10/04
[10] Unity Community Mediation Team and the Minneapolis Police Department. “MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.” December, 2003. http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/2003-meetings/20031215/docs/01_Mediation_Memorandum_Agreement.pdf 5/10/04
[11] ibid
[12] Hodges, Booker T.. “What happened in federal
mediation?” Minnesota Spokesman-Recorder.
1/21/2004 <http://spokesman-recorder.com/news/Article/Article.asp?NewsID=37548&sID=13> 5/10/2004
[13] Communities United Against Police Brutality, “An Analysis of the Minneapolis Federal Mediation Agreement,” <http://www.charityadvantage.com/CUAPB/AnalysisofFedMedAgree.asp> 5/2/2004.
[14] Hawley, David, Pioneer Press. “Group Takes a New Tack in Dispute With Police,” <http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/5668613.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp&ERIGHTS=426231053097034405twincities::elyse_333@hotmail.com&KRD_RM=0nlllojpkmkgggggggghngmjgg|Elyse|N> 5/2/2004.
[15] Interview: Jill Clarke and Jill Waite (March 2004).
[16] People Building Peace
[17] Interview: Michelle Gross (May 2004).
[18] Interview: Jill Clarke (May 2004).
[19] Neighborhood Revitalization Project
<www.nrp.org>
[20] City of Minneapolis: http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/police/outreach/
[21] Hawley, David. “Police, public agree to pact” Pioneer Press. 12-05-03. <http://www.twincities.com/mld/pioneerpress/news/local/7417349.htm>
[22] Section 14 of the
“Federal Mediation Aggreement”
<http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/council/2003-meetings/20031215/docs/01_Mediation_Memorandum_Agreement.pdf
>
[23]
Anderson,
Jr., G.R. “Agreement at last,” City Pages. (12-10-03). <http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/1201/article11724.asp>
[24] Paton, Dean. “New police tool: neighborhood watch by Web.” The Christian Science Monitor May 05, 2003. May 14, 2004 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0505/p01s03-ussc.html>.
[25] ibid.
[26] ibid.
[27] 255, Skolnick, Jerome H., and Fyfe, James J.. Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force. New York: The Free Press, 1993.
[28] Skogan, Wesley G., and Meares, Tracey L.. "Lawful Policing." The Annals for the American Academy. May 2004
[29] 173, Skolnick, Jerome H., and Fyfe, James J.. Above the Law: Police and the Excessive Use of Force. New York: The Free Press, 1993.
[30] 176, ibid.
[31] 180, ibid.
[32] 181, ibid.
[33] Marks, Alexandra. “NYPD as lab for reducing police brutality.” The Christian Science Monitor May 13, 1999.
[34] Ben
H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, Sixth Edition, Beacon Press, 2000.
[35] Sharp, Gene. The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action, Porter Sargent Publishers, 2000.